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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ST. LOUIS BLUES: THE URBAN CRISIS IN THE GATEWAY CITY

COLIN GORDON*
The housing crash and subsequent recession returned our collective
attention to the dismal state of American cities. The last six years have
reminded us of the precarious state of our inner cities, and of the failed public
policies and predatory private policies that got us to that point.1 And they have
pushed that failure and misery into the suburbs—making more visible and
more universal the experience of urban crisis or decline.2 Abandoned or halffinished suburban tracts on the fringes of Las Vegas or Fort Lauderdale mark a
new frontier for that crisis, but it has been with us now for over half a century.
Over that span, the American urban crisis has been defined by a common
set of conditions or circumstances. Those conditions and circumstances, in
turn, were (and in some respects remain) more pronounced in St. Louis than
almost anywhere else.3 “St. Louis is not a typical City,” noted one observer in
the late 1970s, “but, like a Eugene O’Neill play, it shows a general condition in
a stark and dramatic form.”4
First, the American urban crisis is marked by a pattern of general, but
locally uneven, demographic and economic decline. It is not so much that
“cities” declined, as that central cities (and later inner suburbs) declined

* Colin Gordon, Professor and Director of Undergraduate Studies, University of Iowa.
1. See Paul Taylor et al., Wealth Gaps Rise to Record Highs Between Whites, Blacks and
Hispanics, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (July 26, 2011), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/07/
SDT-Wealth-Report_7-26-11_FINAL.pdf; Tatjana Meschede et al., The Racial Wealth Gap
Increases Fourfold, INST. ON ASSETS AND SOC. POL’Y (May 2010), available at http://www.in
sightcced.org/uploads/CRWG/IASP-Racial-Wealth-Gap-Brief-May2010.pdf; KATRIN ANACKER
ET AL., NAT’L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL., THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS AND ITS IMPACT ON
COMMUNITIES OF COLOR (Sept. 2011), available at http://www.ncrc.org/images/stories/pdf/re
search/ncrc_foreclosurewhitepaper_2011.pdf.
2. See Emily Garr & Elizabeth Kneebone, The Suburbanization of Poverty, BROOKINGS
INST. (Jan. 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/1/20%20pover
ty%20kneebone/0120_poverty_paper.pdf.
3. See COLIN GORDON, MAPPING DECLINE: ST. LOUIS AND THE FATE OF THE AMERICAN
CITY 10 (Glenda Gilmore et al. eds., 2008); Mapping Decline: St. Louis and the American City,
HARVARD WORLD MAP, http://worldmap.harvard.edu/maps/866 (last visited APR. 22, 2014).
4. GORDON, supra note 3, at 8.
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relative to the rest of the metropolitan region of which they were a part.5 Of
our fifteen largest central cities in 1950, eleven saw their peak population in
that year—the only exceptions being New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and
Houston.6 And the others didn’t just stop growing: nine of those cities lost
more than a quarter of their population over the next fifty years, and five (St.
Louis, Detroit, Pittsburgh, Buffalo, and Cleveland) lost more than half.7
Consider St. Louis. In 1930, the metropolitan area encompassed four
counties (two in Missouri, two on the Illinois side) and a population of about
1.3 million—of which over 60 percent lived in the City of St. Louis.8 In 1970,
the metro area included two more counties on the Missouri side, and growth
was confined to the suburbs: the City claimed barely a quarter of the
metropolitan population (620,000 of 2.36 million).9 By 2010, the metro area
sprawled across seventeen counties and the City claimed just 10 percent of the
metro population (now nudging 3 million).10 Population density, about 1,000
persons per square mile in 1960, was less than a third of that (322 persons per
square mile) by 2010. In 1950, St. Louis was the eighth largest city in the
nation; it is now the fifty-third largest.11
Second, this decline—but more importantly its unevenness—yielded an
increasingly stark pattern of concentrated poverty and racial segregation.
Alongside the shared prosperity of the postwar boom and the slow but steady
gains of the postwar civil rights movement, central cities seemed to drift in the
opposite direction—becoming poorer, more deeply segregated, and more
isolated over time.12 Nowhere was this truer than in St. Louis, a city whose
postwar demographics were starkly biracial (those identifying themselves as

5. KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED
STATES 4 (1985).
6. Population of the 100 Largest Urban Places and Other Urban Places in the United
States: 1790 to 1990, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, tbls.18, 19 (May 12, 2012) [hereinafter Population
of the 100 Largest], http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027/twps00
27.html.
7. Population of the 100 Largest, supra note 6, at tbls.18, 22.
8. USA Metropolitan Area & Core Cities Population Trends: 1930-1940, DEMOGRAPHIA,
www.demographia.com/db-metro1940.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2014).
9. Major US Metropolitan Areas: Core City & Suburban Population 2000-2008,
DEMOGRAPHIA (Sept. 27, 2009), http://demographia.com/db-msacore.pdf.
10. St. Louis City QuickFacts from the US Census Bureau, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 27,
2013), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/29/2965000.html.
11. Charles D. Schmitz, St. Louis is a World-Class City, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (June
30, 2010), www.stltoday.com/news/opinion/article_e07eb3b8-73b2-5a69-8893-3497c1756b
f2.html.
12. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 4–5 (1993); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY,
CATEGORICALLY UNEQUAL: THE AMERICAN STRATIFICATION SYSTEM 52 (2007); MICHAEL B.
KATZ, WHY DON’T AMERICAN CITIES BURN? 51–52 (2012).
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black or white made up 99 percent of the metro population every census year
until 1990, and still make up more than 95 percent) and whose local housing
patterns have marked it as one of the nation’s “hypersegregated” metropolitan
areas.13
All of this is evident not just in racial occupancy patterns, but in race
relations as well. Racial transition in American cities in the 1930s and 1940s
yielded a nasty pattern of segregation and discrimination enforced and
sustained by restrictive deed instruments, private realty, federal housing and
mortgage policies, local zoning, and an enthusiasm for urban renewal that
equated black occupancy with blight.14 Again, St. Louis stood out. It was no
accident that St. Louis—a city whose organization of property followed the
pattern of most northern settings but whose race relations were essentially
southern—was ground zero for virtually all of the key legal battles over race
and property in the modern era.15
Third, decline brought with it dramatic disinvestment—even
abandonment—in older residential and commercial areas.16 This occurred
despite (and sometimes because of) the urban renewal programs that were
meant to save the cities.17 And, as property fell in value (or off the tax rolls
entirely), local fiscal capacity collapsed—further undermining the public
services and goods (streets, schools, sewers) that made neighborhoods viable.18
Local government, flush with federal redevelopment and highway funds,

13. See Heather I. Macdonald, Mortgage Lending and Residential Integration in a
Hypersegregated MSA: The Case of St. Louis, 35 URB. STUD. 1971, 1973 (1998) (discussing the
St. Louis patterns); John Farley, Race, Not Class: Explaining Racial Housing Segregation in the
St. Louis Metropolitan Area, 2000, 38 SOC. FOCUS 133, 137 (2005); Douglas S. Massey & Nancy
A. Denton, Hypersegregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas: Black and Hispanic Segregation Along
Five Dimension, 26 DEMOGRAPHY 373, 388 (1989); Robert E. Mendelson & Michael A. Quinn,
Residential Patterns in a Midwestern City: The St. Louis Experience, in THE METROPOLITAN
MIDWEST: POLICY PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE 151, 158–60 (Barry Checkoway &
Carl Patton eds., 1985); DAVID LASLO, A BRIEF DEMOGRAPHIC AND SPATIAL HISTORY OF THE
ST. LOUIS REGION: 1950–2000, at 11 (2003).
14. PRESTON H. SMITH, RACIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE BLACK METROPOLIS: HOUSING
POLICY IN POSTWAR CHICAGO 212 (2012).
15. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948) (holding state enforcement of race
restrictive deed covenants to be unconstitutional); Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 449 (1968)
(holding the Civil Rights Act protects private real estate transactions); United States v. City of
Black Jack, 509 F.2d 1179, 1182 (8th Cir. 1974) (discussing an early exclusionary zoning case).
16. ALAN MALLACH, BROOKINGS INST., FACING THE URBAN CHALLENGE: THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT AND AMERICA’S OLDER DISTRESSED CITIES 6 (May 2010), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/5/18%20shrinking%20cities%20
mallach/0518_shrinking_cities_mallach.pdf.
17. Id. at 16–17.
18. MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND
STABILITY 84–85 (1997).
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became a sort of centrifuge that flung people, employment, and tax capacity to
the suburban fringes.19
In St. Louis, these patterns were exaggerated by underlying economic
weaknesses (deindustrialization hit earlier and harder than it did in even the
rest of the rustbelt20), by the unusually fragmented structure of local
government,21 and by state and regional patterns of zoning and land use which
placed few restraints on sprawl.22 As a result, population, development, and
infrastructure sprawled west—leaving some North St. Louis neighborhoods
largely deserted, the remaining houses scattered like tombstones across
untended swaths of vacant land.23 What was commonly labeled “white flight”
was, in greater St. Louis—black flight as well, as African-Americans moved
steadily out of the City and into the postage-stamp municipalities of north St.
Louis County.24
CIRCUMSTANCE, CONSEQUENCE, AND CAUSE
In the broader economic context of the last century, St. Louis faced some
tough odds. But it is a mistake to ascribe urban decline to the immutable
market forces of suburbanization, deindustrialization, and globalization and
leave it at that. There was nothing inevitable about the scale or severity or
character of St. Louis’ urban crisis—all of which were shaped as much by
public policy and political choices as they were by secular economic and
demographic changes. It is not necessary to revisit all of those policies and
choices here.25 But I would like to underscore two important factors that—
especially in combination—fundamentally shaped the St. Louis experience.
A.

Race

As St. Louis and its suburbs navigated the last century, race relations
indelibly colored the motives and the consequences of public policy. The

19. MALLACH, supra note 16, at 8.
20. See Scott Cummings, Racial Inequality and Development Disparities in the St. Louis
Region, in ST. LOUIS METROMORPHOSIS: PAST TRENDS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 99, 104–07,
112–14 (Brady Baybeck & E. Terrence Jones eds., 2004).
21. See Anja Kurki, Measuring Metropolitan Government Structure and its Impact on
Income Distribution in Metropolitan Areas (paper presented at the American Political Science
Meeting, Atlanta, 1999), http://localgov.fsu.edu/readings_papers/form%20of%20govt/Kurki_
Metropolitan_Inequalites.pdf.
22. See ROLF PENDALL ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., FROM TRADITIONAL TO REFORMED: A
REVIEW OF THE LAND USE REGULATIONS IN THE NATION’S 50 LARGEST METROPOLITAN AREAS
12–19 (2006), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2006/8/metro
politanpolicy%20pendall/20060802_pendall.pdf.
23. See Cummings, supra note 20, at 100–01, 104.
24. See GORDON, supra note 3, at 23, 25.
25. See generally id.
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desire to regulate and limit African-American occupancy animated the earliest
efforts at land-use planning—including the profusion of private streets in the
city’s early residential development.26 From 1915 to 1916, long before
conventional urban zoning was even a consideration, city planners pressed for
a racial zoning ordinance that would have confined African-Americans to the
Ville neighborhood in North St. Louis and a scattering of nonresidential tracts
along the river or the rail beds running inland.27 The ordinance passed, but its
implementation was stalled by the Supreme Court’s back-handed admonition
(in Buchanan v Warley) that such laws deprived white property owners of the
right to sell or convey their property as they saw fit.28
In the wake of the 1917 ruling in Buchanan, and in the shadow of the East
St. Louis race riot the same year, local real estate interests moved to implement
the restriction by other means.29 These included an “unrestricted zone” (closely
resembling the footprint of black occupancy contained in the 1916 ordinance)
enforced by the St. Louis Real Estate Exchange, which effectively outlawed
sales to African-Americans in most of the city.30 This was accompanied by a
profusion of race restrictive deed covenants which established more explicit
and enforceable neighborhood schemes of segregation.31 These agreements,
numbering almost 400 in the city by the early 1940s, covered large swaths of
largely white South St. Louis and surrounded the Ville in North St. Louis.32
And these agreements were standard issue in the early suburban development
west of the city, effectively barring African-Americans from all but a few
enclaves in St. Louis County and beyond.33
These restrictive instruments were important both for the ways in which
they shaped the urban landscape in the years before conventional zoning and
land use planning, and for the ways in which they were incorporated into—and
perpetuated by—the public policies that followed. When the city and its
suburbs moved forward with modern zoning ordinances in the 1930s and
1940s, they did so with the explicit intent of sustaining racial restrictions.34 In
St. Louis, where land zoning was implemented after the fact, city planners
protected white neighborhoods with single family designations while lumping

26. Id. at 69.
27. Id. at 70–71.
28. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Roger Rice, Residential Segregation by
Law, 1910-1917, 34 J. S. HIST. 179, 194 (1968)
29. See GORDON, supra note 3, at 71; HARPER BARNES, NEVER BEEN A TIME: THE 1917
RACE RIOT THAT SPARKED THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 69 (2008).
30. See GORDON, supra note 3, at 73, 75.
31. See id. at 73.
32. Id. at 73.
33. See id. at 73, 75.
34. See id. at 83.
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virtually identical neighborhoods on the North side into multifamily zones.35
When the Home Owner’s Loan Corporation risk-rated St. Louis neighborhoods
for New Deal-Era housing policies (including new long-term mortgages
backed by the Federal House Administration), they turned to local real estate
interests who—unsurprisingly—used patterns of black occupancy and the
presence (or absence) of restrictive deed covenants as the primary determinant
of neighborhood prospects.36
To add insult to injury, the policies intended to arrest urban decline
proceeded from exactly the same assumptions. Urban renewal programs,
including “slum clearance” projects in St. Louis and its suburbs, consistently
equated black occupancy with “blight.”37 Public housing, erected to warehouse
those displaced by urban renewal, hardened patterns of local segregation—in
part because suburban municipalities and counties, for most of this era, refused
to even create public housing authorities.38 Public improvements, including the
urban highway infrastructure, skirted white neighborhoods and bulldozed
across black neighborhoods.39 By the end of the 1970s, one in ten St. Louis
families—the overwhelming majority of them African-American—had been
displaced by urban renewal or highway development.40
The development of Greater St. Louis was shaped by both the “Berlin
Wall” of the city’s western border and by the “Delmar Divide” that split the
city itself down the middle.41 The confluence of private and public policies—
animated and motivated by racial anxiety or animus—led to radically different
developmental trajectories in St. Louis and in its suburbs, and in North and
South St. Louis.42 The consequences are lasting and sustained. The
disinvestment that followed from discriminatory federal and state and local
policies only ensured that neglected neighborhoods would fall further behind—
and harden the view that they posed a threat to public safety, public finance,
and property values. And, because that discrimination was attached so firmly
to property (the primary source of family and intergenerational wealth), it
ensured that African-Americans would make little economic progress, even as
the legal edifice of “Jim Crow” and its Northern variants slowly collapsed.43

35. See id. at 124–25.
36. See GORDON, supra note 3, at 88–91.
37. See id. at 205.
38. See id. at 99–100.
39. See id. at 206.
40. See id.
41. GORDON, supra note 3, at 125, 131.
42. Id. at 145–46.
43. See William J. Collins and Robert A. Margo, Race and the Value of Owner-Occupied
Housing 1940-1990 (LEVY ECON. INST. Working Paper No. 310, 2000); William J. Collins &
Robert A. Margo, Race and Home Ownership: A Century-Long View, 38 EXPLORATIONS IN
ECON. HIST. 68, 68–69 (2001). See generally SIGNE-MARY MCKERNAN ET AL., URB. INST., LESS
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Political Fragmentation

The other major factor shaping the development of Greater St. Louis was
political fragmentation. In one respect, American cities and municipalities are
notoriously undergoverned. Most municipal functions and responsibilities flow
from the police power to safeguard public welfare and safety.44 In many areas
(think transportation or schools), cities are simply the political and fiscal
handmaidens of state and federal policy. But, in another important respect,
American metros are over-governed, their key responsibilities fragmented
across scores, sometime hundreds, of overlapping and competing
jurisdictions.45 This jurisdictional disarray alone has had enormous
implications—most of them negative—for local land use, zoning, economic
development, and fiscal capacity.46 Each metropolitan area represents an
organic economic, social, and demographic unit. It has its assets, challenges,
and liabilities. But, carved up into a patchwork of competing fiefdoms, local
governance becomes a scramble to hoard the assets, shirk the challenges, and
press the liabilities onto some other municipal fragment.47
In Greater St. Louis, this fragmentation invited and encouraged local
governments to engage in the forms of racial discrimination and segregation
sketched above. Local zoning—including the prevalence of large lot singlefamily zones, a virtual prohibition on multifamily housing in the central outer
suburbs, and the inability or unwillingness of the city and the inner suburbs to
accomplish either of these restrictions—intentionally and effectively sorted the
metropolitan population by class and race.48 Similarly, the erection of public
housing—dense on the margins of the city’s urban renewal projects, and
virtually non-existent elsewhere in the metro area—ensured a distribution of
poverty (and its costs) according to political calculation and political
capacity.49
The perils of fragmentation are also evident in the distribution of economic
resources. Deindustrialization devastated many central cities, but metropolitan
economies—even in as troubled a setting as St. Louis--continued to grow. So
while the market might be blamed for some of the losses—the industrial
wreckage on the riverfront, the shuttered plants running along the city’s rail
THAN EQUAL: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN WEALTH ACCUMULATION (Apr. 2013), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412802-Less-Than-Equal-Racial-Disparities-in-Wealth-Ac
cumulation.pdf.
44. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 95 (1990).
45. Id. at 73.
46. Id. at 60.
47. NEIL LITTLEFIELD, METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEMS AND MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 2–3
(1962); ORFIELD, supra note 18, at 5–6; Briffault, supra note 44, at 10–11.
48. LITTLEFIELD, supra note 47, at 4.
49. Briffault, supra note 44, at 100.
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corridors—the durability of those losses, and the fact that the gains were
hoarded elsewhere, was all driven by politics and policy.
Indeed, much of the economic growth in St. Louis County and the outer
suburbs came at the expense of the city. The inner suburb of Clayton
reinvented itself as a corporate park, using zoning and economic incentives to
poach the city of much of its central business district in the 1950s and 1960s.50
When General Motors closed its plant in North St. Louis in the early 1980s, it
moved production to nearby Wentzville and to Bowling Green (Ohio)—both
sites prepared to offer substantial tax incentives for the move.51 In 1948, the
combined private sector job base of St. Louis and St. Louis County was about
half a million—and almost 95 percent of those jobs in the City of St. Louis.
Fifty years later, that job base had almost doubled—but less than a third
remained in the city.52
There was nothing natural or inevitable about this shift. Suburban
municipalities did everything they could to pick off the city’s assets (and each
other’s), luring most of the region’s office space, retail space, and production
facilities to the urban fringe by the 1980s.53 Local governments played musical
chairs with economic development, pushing subsidized shopping malls west
into the cornfields and all but abandoning those built just years earlier.54 This
strategy was abetted by municipal fragmentation, by Missouri’s peculiar sales
tax system (which allowed local governments to declare themselves “point of
origin” cities and keep the taxes generated within their borders), and by the
loose interpretation of urban renewal law (which allowed local governments to
label anything on which the paint had dried as “blighted”).55 As with the
parallel demographic shifts, the metropolitan economy did not decline—but it
thinned out, and became both more uneven and more unequal.
THE STAKES
None of this would matter much—at least as a political issue—if different
policies would simply have yielded a different distribution of winners and
losers. But it’s pretty clear that everyone lost; that St. Louis today is a lesser

50. GORDON, supra note 3, at 131, 145–47.
51. Id. at 131, 138.
52. Earl Kersten & D. Reid Ross, Clayton: A New Metropolitan Focus in the St. Louis Area,
58 ANNALS OF THE ASS’N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS 637, 644–46 (1968).
53. Greg LeRoy & Sara Hinkley, Opportunities for Linking Movements: Workforce
Development and Smart Growth, GOODS JOBS FIRST (2000), http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/
default/files/docs/pdf/workforce.pdf.
54. See Colin Gordon, Blighting the Way: Urban Renewal, Economic Development, and the
Elusive Definition of ‘Blight,’ 31 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 305, 319 (2004).
55. EAST-WEST GATEWAY, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS AND FISCAL IMPACTS
OF THE USE OF DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES IN THE ST. LOUIS REGION, FINAL REPORT 29 (Jan.
2011), available at http://www.ewgateway.org/library/reports/reports-pg2/reports-pg2.htm.
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city—in qualitative and quantitative terms—than it might have been. The
victories, such as they were, were temporary. St. Louis County fought tooth
and nail with the city over basic development and planning issues for decades,
much of this with the goal of insulating the county and its municipalities from
the perceived costs of more inclusionary policies.56 The result? Disinvestment
and fiscal troubles in the city pushed migration west into the county—where
the clear majority of the metro’s African-Americans now live.57 The line
between urban crisis and suburban affluence is moving steadily west.
And local victories, such as they were, invariably came at the expense of
the region as a whole. If two outer suburbs battled over who landed the next
Target or Walmart, the result was predictable: a spanking new retail store
(often accompanied by closing of another one) that paid little if any local taxes
for the foreseeable future.58 If those suburbs sat out the contest, they might not
be able to control where in the metropolitan region that new store would be
built—but it, and its taxable value, would show up somewhere. A local
government might crow about landing episodic new investment, but—across
the metro, and in the long run—the benefits dissipated. Local tax breaks
shaped the distribution of new investment across the metropolitan region, but
not its level.59 In the bargain, they shaped the distribution of the tax base but
actually reduced its returns.60 And the persistence of this competition meant
that all such investments were less durable, and unlikely to outlive their tax
abatements.
Even more importantly, we have—in allowing our cities to decline–
squandered a precious political and economic resource. Cities drive the
economy (our top 100 metros, on merely 12 percent our land area, account for
at least three-quarters of GDP).61 Historically and currently, our metropolitan
regions are home to the best jobs and opportunities—and to the institutions,
including private and public sector trade unionism, that help to sustain job
quality. This combination of union density and residential density discourages
competition on wages and encourages competition on efficiency and quality: it
blocks the economic low road and paves the high road. This benefits workers
and their employers, for whom the benefits of the high road settings (a welltrained workforce, easy access to suppliers and consumers, decent public
goods) far outweigh the costs.62
56. Gordon, supra note 54, at 305, 319.
57. EAST-WEST GATEWAY, supra note 55, at 29–30; Gordon, supra note 54.
58. See GORDON, supra note 3, at 181-84.
59. EAST-WEST GATEWAY, supra note 55, at 30–31.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See ALAN BERUBE, METRO. POL’Y PROGRAM, BROOKINGS INST., METRONATION: HOW
U.S. METROPOLITAN AREAS FUEL AMERICAN PROSPERITY 32 (2007), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2007/11/06-metronation-berube.
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Cities house our best schools and our leading cultural institutions. Cities
are, by any measure, green and cleaner than sparser forms of economic or
residential development.63 And cities, by virtue of their density and diversity,
nurture inclusive and progressive politics. Perhaps the starkest determinant of
the presidential vote in 2012 was population density: across red and blue states,
98 percent of the most densely-populated counties went to Obama, and 98
percent of the least densely-populated counties went to Romney.64 The
takeaway would seem to be this: People who live close to one another are more
tolerant and empathetic; they are more likely to know someone of a different
color, a different income group, or a different sexual orientation.65 They rely
upon and appreciate the provision of public goods and public services (transit,
parks, garbage collection)—even as they consume fewer public dollars than
their red state counterparts.66 And they have a deeper appreciation of the
regulatory standards (guns, labor conditions, food, public health) that promise
us a modicum of safety and security.67
Yet, for all of their natural advantages and assets, metropolitan areas like
Greater St. Louis are in real trouble. That trouble stems not from the viability
of the American cities in the new global economy, but from the unequal
distribution of economic assets and rewards within those cities. While racial
segregation, in St. Louis and elsewhere, has eased somewhat,68 economic
segregation has hardened in the last generation. In 1970 only 15 percent of
families lived in neighborhoods that could be considered as either affluent
(those where median incomes were greater than 150 percent of median income
in their metropolitan areas) or poor (those where median incomes were less

63. DANIEL LURIA & JOEL ROGERS, METRO FUTURES: ECONOMIC SOLUTIONS FOR CITIES
13 (1999).
64. LURIA AND RODGERS, supra note 63, at 15. See generally ORFIELD, supra note 47; Colin
Gordon, The Lost City of Solidarity: Metropolitan Unionism in Historical Perspective, 27 POL. &
SOC’Y 561 (1999).
65. Richard Florida, Why Bigger Cities Are Greener, ATL. CITIES (Apr. 19, 2012),
http://www.theatlanticcities.com/jobs-and-economy/2012/04/why-bigger-cities-are-greener/863/.
66. Colin Gordon, How the Density of Your County Effects How You Vote, ATL. CITIES (Apr.
1, 2013), http://www.theatlanticcities.com/politics/2013/04/how-density-your-county-affects-how
-you-vote/5066/; See Federal Taxes Paid vs. Federal Spending, TAX FOUND. (Oct. 19, 2007),
available at http://taxfoundation.org/article/federal-taxes-paid-vs-federal-spending-received-state1981-2005.
67. Sage R. Myers et. al., Safety in Numbers: Are Major Cities the Safest Places in the
United States?, 62 ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MED. 408, 415 (2013).
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than 67 percent of metropolitan median income).69 By 2007, twice the share of
families—over 30 percent—lived in such neighborhoods.70
These patterns of local inequality are starker in settings (like St. Louis)
with deeper histories of racial segregation, and they are starker in settings (like
St. Louis) where law and politics pose few obstacles to sprawl. In 1950,
American cities encompassed about 70 million in persons and about 13,000
square miles.71 Fifty years later, the urban population had doubled but its
footprint—at over 50,000 square miles—had increased fourfold.72 The
population of the St. Louis metro, as we have seen, grew much more slowly
(from about 1.3 million to about 2 million over the same span), while the
urbanized area increased almost sixfold.73 All of this exaggerated the
background conditions—racial and economic segregation, political and
jurisdictional fragmentation—that have shaped the modern history of greater
St. Louis. And all of this sustained and deepened the erosion of the natural
solidarities—schools, churches, unions, community groups—that might have
made a difference.
This is not, in the end, really about “urban decline” at all. American
metropolitan regions have prospered, and their importance to our polity and to
our economy has grown over time. But the distribution of resources and
opportunities within those metropolitan regions have been (and remain)
dramatically and intentionally uneven. In this sense, American cities—St.
Louis foremost among them—focus our attention on the larger challenge of
pervasive and growing inequality. The problem is not urban decline, but
inequality that is organized and embedded and sustained in local geography.

69. SEAN F. REARDON & KENDRA BISCHOFF, US2010 PROJECT, GROWTH IN THE
RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION OF FAMILIES BY INCOME 1970-2009, at 1 (Nov. 2011), available at
http://www.s4.brown.edu/us2010/Data/Report/report111111.pdf.
70. Id.
71. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, 1950: NUMBER OF
INHABITANTS IX, XVIII tbl.E, XXXIII (1950), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/www/de
cennial.html.
72. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2000 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, pt. 1, at 2, 11 tbl.8
(Nov. 2002), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/phc-1-1-pt1.pdf.
73. Id. at 42 tbl.9.
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